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Abstract
Background: Health IT can play a major role in improving patient safety. Computerized physician order entry with
decision support can alert providers to potential prescribing errors. However, too many alerts can result in providers
ignoring and overriding clinically important ones.
Objective: To evaluate the appropriateness of providers’ drug-drug interaction (DDI) alert overrides, the reasons why
they chose to override these alerts, and what actions they took as a consequence of the alert.
Design: A cross-sectional, observational study of DDI alerts generated over a three-year period between January
1st, 2009, and December 31st, 2011.
Setting: Primary care practices affiliated with two Harvard teaching hospitals. The DDI alerts were screened to
minimize the number of clinically unimportant warnings.
Participants: A total of 24,849 DDI alerts were generated in the study period, with 40% accepted. The top 62
providers with the highest override rate were identified and eight overrides randomly selected for each (a total of 496
alert overrides for 438 patients, 3.3% of the sample).
Results: Overall, 68.2% (338/496) of the DDI alert overrides were considered appropriate. Among inappropriate
overrides,  the  therapeutic  combinations  put  patients  at  increased  risk  of  several  specific  conditions  including:
serotonin  syndrome  (21.5%,  n=34),  cardiotoxicity  (16.5%,  n=26),  or  sharp  falls  in  blood  pressure  or  significant
hypotension  (28.5%,  n=45).  A  small  number  of  drugs  and  DDIs  accounted  for  a  disproportionate  share  of  alert
overrides. Of the 121 appropriate alert overrides where the provider indicated they would “monitor as recommended”,
a detailed chart review revealed that only 35.5% (n=43) actually did. Providers sometimes reported that patients had
already taken interacting medications together (15.7%, n=78), despite no evidence to confirm this.
Conclusions and Relevance: We found that providers continue to override important and useful alerts that are likely
to cause serious patient injuries, even when relatively few false positive alerts are displayed.
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Introduction
Computerized  physician  order  entry  (CPOE)  represents  a
valuable tool that allows medication and laboratory orders to be
entered  electronically  by  health  care  providers.  While  CPOE
can  substantially  reduce  the  number  of  prescription-writing
errors with even limited clinical decision support (CDS)[1], it is
the  CDS  that  makes  it  such  a  powerful  application  for
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 December 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e85071improving  patient  safety  in  both  inpatient  and  ambulatory
settings; the impact will vary depending on the sophistication of
the CDS[2]. CDS systems are designed to assist physicians in
decision-making  by  providing  them  with  real-time,  relevant,
patient-specific information and guidance at various stages in
the  health  care  process[3-6].  These  systems  can  offer  real
practical  benefits  and  substantial  cost  savings  by  alerting
physicians to necessary drug-dosing adjustments, for example,
based  on  a  patient’s  renal  function,  and  potential  hazardous
drug-drug interactions (DDIs) and contraindications that need
to be addressed[7,8].
However,  CDS  is  variably  successful—and  the  success  of
CDS systems often depend on both their intrinsic design and
the  knowledge  bases  that  sit  behind  them.  The  Institute  of
Medicine has suggested that systems should be designed to
make it “hard for people to do the wrong thing and easy for
people to do the right thing”.[9] How closely the CDS advice
matches  a  provider’s  intentions,  and  how  much  control  the
provider  has  over  assessing  and  responding  to  this,  can
influence  its  overall  potential  to  improve  patient  safety[10].
Physicians  are  often  inundated  with  irrelevant  and
inappropriate  alerts,  leading  to  high  override  rates.  For
example, Weingart et al. found that physicians overrode 91.2%
of  drug-allergy  and  89.4%  of  high-severity  drug  interaction
alerts in one study, when the threshold for alerting was set too
low[11]. Too many alerts may result in ‘alert fatigue’, which can
result  in  physicians  overlooking  even  important  clinically
alerts[12]. Much of our recent work has focused on obtaining
the right balance between useful alerting and over-alerting; an
expert panel provided valuable guidance on those DDIs alerts
that  should  be  non-interruptive,  as  well  as  those
contraindicated drug pairs for which physicians should always
be  alerted[13,14].  Interruptive  alerts  usually  require  the
physician  to  provide  a  reason  for  their  decision  to  override
which infers an intention to carry out a particular action like, for
example,  will  monitor  drug  levels  as  recommended.  The
problem with overriding these alerts is that it is often unclear
whether,  in  fact,  the  provider  has  carried  out  this  action  or
simply  ignored  it.  In  addition,  how  human  factors  issues  are
presented  in  the  design  of  the  alerts  is  also  extremely
important[15-17].
In this study, we evaluated how often and more importantly
why  providers  overrode  DDI  alerts,  in  a  setting  in  which
relatively few false positive alerts were being delivered, as the
knowledge  base  had  already  been  “tuned”  to  address  this
issue[10]. Specific outcomes were: (1) the appropriateness of
providers’ DDI alert overrides (2), the reasons why providers
chose to override these alerts, and (3) what actions they took
as a consequence of the alert.
Methods
Research Study site
This study included 36 primary care practices affiliated with
two  Harvard  teaching  hospitals,  Brigham  and  Women’s
Hospital and Massachusetts General Hospital (Boston, MA). A
total of 1718 prescribers serve these sites, which are part of a
regional  integrated  healthcare  delivery  system  -  Partners
HealthCare.
LMR and Clinical Decision Support
Partners  HealthCare  physicians  working  in  the  ambulatory
setting  use  a  self-developed,  Certification  Commission  for
Healthcare  Information  Technology  (CCHIT)-approved,
electronic  health  record  (EHR)  -  the  Longitudinal  Medical
Record (LMR). Implemented in 2000, the LMR allows providers
to  document  patient  problems,  medications,  allergies,  and
encounter notes; access laboratory and radiology reports; write
prescriptions and communicate with other healthcare providers.
The LMR has clinical decision support capability in the form of
medication  alerts  for  drug-allergy  and  DDIs,  and  drug
suggestions in patients with renal failure, geriatrics, and those
on duplicate therapy. DDI alerts are generated at the time of
ordering, and use data from patients’ active medication list and
existing  Partners  DDI  knowledge  base.  Partners  DDI
knowledge  base  currently  consists  of  approximately  5,000
active DDI rules, sourced from commercial knowledge bases
such as First DataBank, Inc., and reviewed and approved by
the  Partners  DDI  Content  Committee.  This  knowledge  base
has been iteratively improved over time to reduce the number
of false positive alerts[10,13,14].
When a DDI alert is generated, a specific recommendation is
presented  to  the  physician,  which  is  linked  to  a  monograph.
The recommendation includes the specific type of interaction
and  often  suggests  a  particular  course  of  action  (e.g.,  avoid
concurrent use of both drugs). Level 1 alerts indicate a very
serious, life-threatening interaction and require the provider to
discontinue the interacting medicine in order to proceed. Level
2  alerts  suggest  an  undesirable  interaction  likely  to  cause
serious injury, and give the provider the option of ‘cancelling’
the order or ‘overriding’ the alert. Should the physician choose
to  override  the  alert,  they  are  required  to  select  one  of  the
following coded reasons in order to proceed: “Will monitor as
recommended”, “Will adjust dose as recommended”, “Patient
has  already  tolerated  combination”,  “No  reasonable
alternatives” or “Other” (Figure 1). If “Other” is selected, further
details should be entered in the free-text field. The provider will
also be given the opportunity to order follow-up lab tests at this
time, if indicated. Level 3 alerts specify the possibility of a less
serious,  undesirable  interaction  and  are  presented  as  non-
interruptive alerts.
Study design and sample selection
This study was a cross-sectional, observational study of DDI
alerts generated over a three-year period between January 1st,
2009, and December 31st, 2011. Access to these data required
approval of the Partners Human Research Committee (PHRC),
which  is  the  Institutional  Review  Board  (IRB)  of  Partners
Research Management at Partners HealthCare. On receiving
specific IRB approval for this study, all Level 2 DDI alerts that
were  overridden  were  downloaded  (total  14,966  overrides,
60.2%  of  alerts  generated).  Patients  who  did  not  give
permission  for  their  information  to  be  stored  in  the  hospital
database and used for research were excluded. Our sample
was then limited to providers who had received 20 or more DDI
Examining Drug-Drug Interaction Alerts Overrides
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 December 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e85071alerts (opportunity to override), and the number of times each
provider overrode these alerts calculated. The top 62 providers
with  the  highest  override  rate  were  identified  and  eight
overrides randomly selected for each provider (a total of 496
alert  overrides  for  438  patients,  3.3%  of  the  sample).  The
downloaded file included patients’ names and medical record
identification numbers; names of both medicines that triggered
the  DDI  alert;  date  of  alert;  practice  location;  prescribers’
names, identification numbers, sex, age, level and experience;
and the reasons given by providers at the time of overriding the
alert. Any duplicates were removed and replaced, and patient
information anonymized prior to analysis.
In  the  initial  analysis,  a  physician  and  pharmacist  expert
panel  screened  the  sample  for  severe  or  contraindicated
interactions,  based  on  the  strength  of  the  supporting  clinical
evidence  and  the  severity  of  the  adverse  events  in  different
knowledge  bases,  such  as  Partners  Healthcare  System
Medication  Knowledge  Base  (PHS  MKB);  commercial
medication knowledge bases such as Micromedex (New York,
New  York,  USA);  First  DataBank  (FDB)  (San  Francisco,
California, USA); and http://www.drugs.com. Alert overrides of
therapeutic duplications (e.g., sumatriptan and rizatriptan) and
therapeutic combinations that put the patient at an increased
risk of (i) serotonin syndrome (e.g., fluoxetine-sumatriptan), (ii)
seizures  (e.g.,  tramadol-cyclobenzaprine),  (iii)  infection  (e.g.,
hydroxyurea-zoster vaccine live), (iv) bone marrow suppression
(e.g.,  methotrexate-trimethoprim),  (v)  bleeding  (e.g.,
dabigatran-ketoconazole),  (vi)  cardiotoxicity  (e.g.,  QT
prolongation, torsades de pointes, cardiac arrest), (vii) opioid
withdraw symptoms (e.g., morphine-naltrexone), (viii) priapism
(e.g., tadalafil-clarithromycin), (ix) sharp falls in blood pressure
(e.g.,  sildenafil-nitroglycerin),  or  significant  hypotension  (e.g.,
sildenafil-tamsulosin),  (x)  reduced  virologic  response  (e.g.,
tenofovir-atazanavir), and (xi) myopathy / rhabdomyolysis (e.g.,
diltiazem-high  dose  simvastatin)  were  all  considered
inappropriate.  Therapeutic  combinations  that  may  result  in
decreased  bioavailability  and  clinical  effectiveness  of  one  or
both drugs were also considered inappropriate. If the provider
indicated  that  there  were  “no  reasonable  alternatives”,  “the
patient  had  already  tolerated  the  combination”,  or  they  had
“other” reason(s) for prescribing both drugs together, the record
was put forward for detailed chart review. If the provider gave
more  than  one  reason,  the  carrying  out  of  both  actions  was
assessed. Topically applied, ophthalmic and otic preparations
were considered appropriate. Alert overrides of DDIs involving
epinephrine  autoinjector  were  also  considered  appropriate
when prescribed for severe allergic reactions.
Detailed chart review
The  purpose  of  the  review  was  to  ascertain  whether  the
provider had carried out their intended action(s). Table 1 and 2
contain the criteria used for assessment of all appropriate alert
overrides.  An  academic  pharmacist  (S.P.S)  reviewed  the
electronic medical record for each of the 338 overrides from the
date the alert was triggered. An attending physician (K.C.N.)
independently  reviewed  a  sample  of  these  medical  charts
(23.7%, n= 80) and inter-rater agreement calculated and found
to be excellent (κ=0.84). Any disagreements were resolved by
discussion with a third reviewer (D.W.B.).
Data Analysis
Data  were  downloaded  directly  into  Microsoft  Excel  2011
(Microsoft  Corp,  Redmond,  WA).  Descriptive  statistics  were
used to summarize the alert overrides considered appropriate,
the drugs and DDIs responsible for generating the majority of
alerts, the override reasons given by providers and the actions
they  took.  Comparisons  involving  categorical  variables  were
performed using Rao-Scott chi-square test statistics, adjusting
for clustering of providers. We used SAS statistical software,
version 9.3 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA) for all statistical
analyses.
Results
Summary
After the initial screening, 68.2% (338/496) of the DDI alert
overrides were considered appropriate. A detailed review of the
Figure 1.  Screenshot of a Level 2 alert.  
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085071.g001
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carried out in 63.3% (214/338) of these cases. One hundred
and  thirteen  different  drugs,  and  119  different  drug-drug
interactions, were found to have triggered the 496 DDI alerts.
Eight  drugs  in  particular  were  responsible  for  generating
approximately  three  quarters  of  these  alerts:  simvastatin
(20.6%, n=102), sildenafil (9.9%, n=49), tramadol (9.5%, n=47),
citalopram (7.7%, n=38), amlodipine (7.5%, n=37), tamsulosin
(7.1%, n=35), azithromycin (6.5%, n=32), and warfarin (6.3%,
n=31).
Drug-drug and class-class interactions
Cumulatively,  44  of  the  different  drug-drug  interactions
accounted  for  over  half  (265/496)  of  the  alerts  shown  to
providers,  and  could  be  categorized  into  ten  class-class
interactions (Table 3). The calcium channel blockers – statins
(class-class)  interaction  was  triggered  most  often  (14.5%,
n=72),  with  amlodipine  –  simvastatin  (drug-drug)  interaction
accounting  for  over  half  (51.3%,  n=37)  of  the  alerts.  The
phosphodiesterase  type-5  inhibitors  –  alpha-adrenoceptor
Table 1. Criteria for assessment of intended actions.
Coded Reason for DDI
Alert Override Criteria
1. Will monitor as
recommended
Test ordered within the specified time period (see
Table 2)
2. Patient has already
tolerated combination
Five half-lives of the newly started or more recently
started medicine have elapsed
3. No reasonable
alternative
Evidence suggests that no other drug within the same
therapeutic class was a safer alternative, and/or
appropriate monitoring/dose adjustment was
conducted
4. Will adjust dose as
recommended
The dose was adjusted according to the alert
recommendations, or If no recommended dose was
specified, the appropriate monitoring was carried out
and any necessary dose adjustment made during the
course of treatment.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085071.t001
Table  2.  Time  period  within  which  the  test  should  be
ordered after alert override.
  Time period
Creatine kinase 12 weeks
Cyclosporine 8 weeks
Digoxin 2 weeks
HbA1c 12 weeks
Lithium 12 weeks
Methotrexate 3 days
PT-INR (Prothrombin Time - International Normalized Ratio) 3 weeks
Respiratory status 4 weeks
Sirolimus 2 weeks
Tacrolimus 1 week
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085071.t002
blocking  drugs  (class-class)  interaction  was  second  highest
(10.7%,  n=53),  with  sildenafil  –  tamsulosin  (drug-drug)
interaction making up less than half (47.2%, n=25) of the alerts
generated. The selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors – 5 HT1
receptor  agonists  (class-class)  interaction  and  selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors – opioid analgesics (class-class)
interaction were third (7.3%, n=36) and fourth highest (3.4%,
n=17)  respectively.  In  the  latter  group,  the  citalopram  –
tramadol  (drug-drug)  interaction  triggering  over  half  of  these
alerts (58.8%, n=10).
Table  3.  Top  10  drug  class-class  interactions  that  were
overridden.
  Object Drug / Class* Precipitant Drug / Class
†
Total no. (%)
of alert
overrides
1.
Calcium channel blockers (i.e.,
amlodipine; diltiazem; verapamil)
Statins (i.e., simvastatin;
lovastatin)
72 (14.5)
2.
Phosphodiesterase type-5
inhibitors (i.e., sildenafil; tadalafil;
vardenafil)
Alpha-adrenoceptor
blocking drugs (i.e.,
tamsulosin; terazosin;
doxazosin; alfuzosin)
53 (10.7)
3.
Antidepressants - selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (i.e.,
citalopram; sertraline; fluoxetine;
paroxetine; escitalopram;
fluvoxamine)
5 HT1 receptor agonists
- ‘Triptans’ (i.e.,
sumatriptan; eletriptan;
zolmitriptan; rizatriptan;
almotriptan)
36 (7.3)
4.
Antidepressants - selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (i.e.,
citalopram; sertraline)
Opioid Analgesics (i.e.,
tramadol)
17 (3.4)
5.
Antidepressants – tricyclic (i.e.,
amitriptyline; nortriptyline,
doxepin, imipramine)
Opioid Analgesics (i.e.,
tramadol)
16 (3.2)
6.
Antibacterial drugs – macrolides
(i.e., azithromycin; clarithromycin)
Statins (i.e., simvastatin;
atorvastatin)
16 (3.2)
7.
Central nervous system
stimulants (i.e., amphetamine /
dextroamphetamine)
Proton pump inhibitors
(i.e., omeprazole;
pantoprazole)
15 (3.0)
8.
Antibacterial drugs –
sulphonamides and trimethoprim
(i.e., trimethoprim/
sulfamethoxazole)
Oral anticoagulants –
coumarins (i.e., warfarin)
14 (2.8)
9.
Lipid-regulating drugs – fibrates
(i.e., gemfibrozil)
Statins (i.e., simvastatin;
rosuvastatin)
13 (2.6)
10.
Sympathomimetics (e.g.,
epinephrine autoinjector)
Beta-adrenoceptor
blocking drugs (i.e.,
propranolol; labetalol)
13 (2.6)
  Total 265 (53.4)
* The object drug was defined as the drug that has its therapeutic effect modified
by the interaction process.
†  The  precipitant  drug  was  defined  as  the  drug  responsible  for  affecting  the
pharmacologic action or the pharmacokinetic properties of the object drug.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085071.t003
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Over one third (158/496) of alert overrides were judged to be
inappropriate as the therapeutic combinations put patients at
increased  risk  of  (i)  serotonin  syndrome  (21.5%,  n=34),
seizures (4.4%, n=7), or both (5.7%, n= 9); (ii) infection (2.5%,
n=4); (iii) bone marrow suppression (1.9%, n=3); (iv) bleeding
(0.6%,  n=1),  (v)  cardiotoxicity  (16.5%,  n=26);  (vi)  opioid
withdraw symptoms (0.6%, n=1), (vii) priapism (8.2%, n=13),
(viii)  sharp  falls  in  blood  pressure  or  significant  hypotension
(28.5%, n=45); or (x) reduced virologic response (1.3%, n=2).
Therapeutic  duplications  (1.9%,  n=3)  and  therapeutic
combinations  (6.3%,  n=10)  that  may  result  in  decreased
bioavailability and clinical effectiveness of one or both drugs
were also considered inappropriate. Over half of the providers
(59.7%, n=37) were found to have inappropriately overridden
three or more alerts.
Reasons for alert overrides
The most common coded reasons for overriding DDI alerts
were  ‘will  monitor  as  recommended’  (43.9%,  n=218),  ‘will
adjust dose as recommended’ (16.9%, n=84), and ‘patient has
already tolerated combination’ (15.7%, n=78). Providers chose
the  coded  reason  ‘other’  in  19.7%  (n=98)  of  alert  overrides,
providing a free-text explanation for why they chose to override
the alert in only 3.6% (n=18) of cases (Table 4). In 13 of these
18  cases,  the  provider  commented  that  the  drug  had  been
recommended by another healthcare provider (n=6), the patient
had already been counseled not to take both drugs together
(n=3),  or  the  patient  was  no  longer  taking  one  of  the  drugs
listed as a potential cause of the interaction (n=4). In two more
cases, the provider wrote that they were tapering one of the
interacting drugs.
Carrying out the desired actions
The desired action was carried out in only 63.3% (214/338)
of  cases.  Of  the  121  appropriate  alert  overrides  where  the
provider said they would “monitor as recommended”, a detailed
chart  review  revealed  that  only  35.5%  (n=43)  actually
completed  the  monitoring.  Where  the  provider  indicated  that
they would “adjust dose as recommended”, 60% (n=21) of 35
appropriate alert overrides adjusted the dose according to the
Table 4. Coded reasons given by providers for overriding
DDI alerts.
Coded Reasons No. (%)*
Will monitor as recommended 218 (43.9)
Will adjust dose as recommended 84 (16.9)
Patient has already tolerated combination 78 (15.7)
No reasonable alternatives 2 (0.4)
Other (with no free text reason provided) 80 (16.1)
Other (with free text reason provided) 18 (3.6)
Combinations of the coded reasons listed above 16 (3.2)
Total 496
* Percentages have been rounded and may not total 100.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085071.t004
alert  recommendations;  if  no  recommended  dose  was
specified, the appropriate monitoring was found to have been
carried out and any necessary dose adjustment made during
the course of treatment. Where the provider selected the coded
reason  “patient  has  already  tolerated  combination”,  five  half-
lives of the newly started (or more recently started) medicine
had  elapsed  in  80.8%  (n=63)  of  cases.  Providers  chose  the
coded reason “other” (without providing a free-text explanation)
in  16.1%  (n=80)  of  alert  overrides;  a  potential  reason  was
found  in  the  notes  for  87.5%  (n=70)  of  these  cases,  with
patients  previously  prescribed  both  drugs  together  in  58.8%
(n=47) of cases.
Providers’ attributes associated with alert overrides
We conducted a univariable analysis to see if factors such as
sex, age, and level and experience, were each associated with
the decision to 1) appropriately override the alert and 2) carry
out  the  intended  action  (Table  5).  Providers’  level  and
experience appeared to be the only factor associated with the
decision to carry out the intended action, with staff physicians
more  experienced  and  less  likely  to  carry  out  the  intending
action than to carry them out (61.3% vs 31.1%; p<.001).
Discussion
Computer order entry linked with CDS holds great promise
for  improving  medication  safety,  quality,  and  efficiency.
However,  many  implementations  have  not  achieved  the
desired  results,  and  DDIs  have  been  an  especially  complex
domain.  Few  studies  have  looked  at  the  appropriateness  of
DDI  alert  overrides  or  whether  providers  actually  carried  out
their  intended  actions.  In  this  study,  providers  appropriately
overrode just over two-thirds of the DDI alerts and carried out
the intended action in less than two-thirds of these cases.
We  found  that  just  eight  drugs  were  responsible  for
generating approximately three quarters of important DDI alerts
in this population. Drawing comparisons with existing literature,
Weingart et al.[11] found that certain drugs, one of which was
similar  (e.g.,  azithromycin),  accounted  for  approximately  one
third of alerts. Taking a larger sample of drug interaction alerts,
we found different interactions generated over half of the alert
overrides.  Some  of  these  combinations  should  essentially
never be used as they put patients at increased risk of potential
lethal  arrhythmia  (torsades  de  pointes).  Despite  extensively
modifying  our  CDS  system  with  fewer  but  more  meaningful
interruptive alerts[10], our study shows that providers continue
to  override  important  and  useful  alerts,  which  are  likely  to
cause  serious  patient  injuries  (Level  2).  This  raises  broader
questions  around  whether  we  should  be  reaching  out  to
providers who are not prescribing optimally and working with
them to improve their prescribing.
To understand why users chose to override these alerts, this
study  also  captured  the  coded  and  free-text  reasons  they
provided.  Similar  to  a  previous  study[10],  the  majority  of
providers  chose  the  coded  reason  “will  monitor  as
recommended”, with others selecting the coded reason “other”
and  then  leaving  the  free-text  box  blank.  Failure  to  provide
free-text  explanations  for  why  alerts  were  overridden  may
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study and the Shah et al. study [10] is that we also reviewed
the  charts  to  see  whether  the  provider  actually  took  action
(e.g., monitored the required levels or adjusted the dose) as a
consequence of the alert. Our study showed how the intended
action was carried out in only two-thirds of cases. This is an
important  finding  as  it  raises  concerns  over  patient  safety.
Failure to monitor a patient’s drug levels (e.g., digoxin) after
initiation of an interacting drug (e.g., verapamil) can result in
potentially  serious  side  effects  for  the  patient[18].  Our  study
also revealed how some providers selected the coded reason
“patient has already tolerated combination”, yet no information
was  found  to  suggest  that  the  patient  had  been  taking  both
drugs together previously. Although difficult to say for certain, it
is possible that some providers may have randomly chosen this
(or indeed potentially any) coded reason in order to proceed
with the order. More research is needed to explore the human
factors  elements  that  influence  provider  behaviour,  including
non-clinical motivations of providers, such as patient demands,
workload, time constraints in a busy office practice, attitudes
towards  particular  diseases  or  patients,  habits,  and  peer
influence.
Like any research study, this study had inherent limitations. It
was  undertaken  within  a  single  healthcare  delivery  system
using  one  outpatient  prescribing  system  and,  as  such,  is
difficult  to  assess  how  generalizable  the  results  are  to  other
prescribing systems. It was also possible for patients to have
been  receiving  care  from  providers  outside  the  integrated
Partners HealthCare system. In some cases, this may not have
been  documented  in  the  patients’  records.  Notwithstanding
these  limitations,  the  findings  have  important  implications  for
the future design of clinical decision support alerts.
Conclusion
An important aspect of CDS is screening of severe DDIs and
prompting providers to take action to prevent concomitant use.
We found that, despite extensively modifying our CDS system
to improve user acceptance and show only the most important
alerts,  providers  continued  to  override  these  alerts  that  are
likely to cause serious patient injuries. More needs to be done
to  effectively  feedback  to  providers  with  high  inappropriate
override  rates  and  improve  prescribing  safety  in  the  primary
care setting.
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Table 5. Providers’ attributes associated with alert overrides.
  Stage 1: Initial screening Stage 2: Chart review
  No. (%) of alert overrides*   No. (%) of alert overrides*  
Provider attributes Appropriate (n=338) Inappropriate (n=158) Total (n=496) P Value Actioned (n = 214) Not actioned (n = 124) Total (n=338) P Value
Sex       0.0022       0.1837
Male (n=25) 112(33.1) 88(55.7) 200(40.3)   63(29.4) 49(39.5) 112(33.1)  
Female (n=37) 226(66.9) 70(44.3) 296(59.7)   151(70.6) 75(60.5) 226(66.9)  
Age, y       0.6151       0.1786
< 35 (n=14) 77(22.8) 35(22.2) 112(22.6)   46(21.5) 31(25.0) 77(22.8)  
35 - 65 (n=45) 249(73.7) 111(70.3) 360(72.6)   163(76.2) 86(69.4) 249(73.7)  
> 65 (n=3) 12(3.6) 12(7.6) 24(4.8)   5(2.3) 7(5.7) 12(3.6)  
Level & experience       0.1019       <.0001
Staff physician (n=31) 143(42.3) 105(66.4) 248(50.0)   67(31.3) 76(61.3) 143(42.3)  
House officer/fellow (n=4) 25(7.8) 7(4.4) 32(6.5)   16(7.5) 9(7.3) 25(7.4)  
Nurse (n=9) 59(17.5) 13(8.2) 72(14.5)   49(22.9) 10(8.1) 59(17.5)  
Medical assistants (n=5) 34(10.1) 6(3.8) 40(8.1)   33(15.4) 1(0.8) 34(10.1)  
Resident (n=7) 39(11.5) 17(10.8) 56(11.3)   21(9.8) 18(14.5) 39(11.5)  
Unknown/Undisclosed (n=6) 38(11.3) 10(6.3) 48(9.7)   28(13.1) 10(8.1) 38(11.2)  
* Percentages have been rounded and may not total 100.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085071.t005
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